On the evaluation measures for machine learning algorithms for safety-critical systems by Gharib, M. & Bondavalli, A.
On the Evaluation Measures for Machine Learning
Algorithms for Safety-critical Systems
(Short Paper)
Mohamad Gharib and Andrea Bondavalli
University of Florence - DiMaI, Viale Morgagni 65, Florence, Italy
{mohamad.gharib,andrea.bondavalli}@unifi.it
Abstract—The ability of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms
to learn and work with incomplete knowledge has motivated
many system manufacturers to include such algorithms in their
products. However, some of these systems can be described as
Safety-Critical Systems (SCS) since their failure may cause injury
or even death to humans. Therefore, the performance of ML
algorithms with respect to the safety requirements of such sys-
tems must be evaluated before they are used in their operational
environment. Although there exist several measures that can be
used for evaluating the performance of ML algorithms, most
of these measures focus mainly on some properties of interest
in the domains where they were developed. For example, Recall,
Precision and F-Factor are, usually, used in Information Retrieval
(IR) domain, and they mainly focus on correct predictions with
less emphasis on incorrect predictions, which are very important
in SCS. Accordingly, such measures need to be tuned to fit the
needs for evaluating the safe performance of ML algorithms. This
position paper presents the authors’ view on the inadequacy of
existing measures, and it proposes a new set of measures to be
used for the evaluation of the safe performance of ML algorithms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, we are witnessing an increasing adoption of
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in many automated sys-
tems covering almost all the main domains of our lives [1].
Their ability to learn and work with novel input/incomplete
knowledge [2], and their generalization capabilities make them
highly desirable solutions for complex problems [3]. This
has motivated many system manufacturers to incorporate ML
algorithms in their products for performing complex tasks such
as pattern recognition, image recognition, and even control [3].
However, some of these systems can be classified as safety-
critical systems, where their failure may cause death or injury
to humans. Accordingly, the safe performance of such ML
algorithms1 must be evaluated/assessed before they are used
in their operational environment.
Generally speaking, an ML algorithm builds a mathematical
model of sample data (e.g., training data set), in order to make
predictions or decisions without being explicitly programmed
to perform such task [4]. This is usually done relying on a clas-
sifier that assigns prediction scores to each observation, which
1Their performance with respect to the safety requirements of the incorpo-
rating system
indicates the certainty of the classifier that such observation
belongs to one of the possible classes [5]. In the case of binary
classifiers, observations belong to one of only two possible
classes (e.g., positive or negative) [4], and the classification
decision is usually taken based on the score of observation
with respect to the classification threshold (e.g., cut-off point).
More specifically, observations with scores higher than the
threshold are predicted to belong to the positive class and
observations with scores lower than the threshold are predicted
to belong to the negative class.
In this context, predictions can be classified into four groups
based on the real known class of the observation and the pre-
dicted one: True Positive (TP)/True Negatives (TP) cases refer
to the Predicted Positives/Negatives that were correct, while
False Positive (FP)/False Negatives (FN) cases refer to the
Predicted Positives/Negatives that were incorrect. These four
groups are organized in four cells in the binary contingency
table that is shown in Figure 1, where green colored cells
contain correct predictions, and incorrect predictions are con-
tained in red color cells. Figure 2 shows a sample distribution
of the count of observations against the predicted probability,
where we can identify the four main areas corresponding to
the four groups of the contingency table.
Taking these groups into consideration, several measures for
evaluating the performance of ML algorithms have been used
in the literature (e.g., Recall, Precision, F-Factor). However,
most of these measures focus mainly on some properties
of interest in the domains where they were developed. For
instance, Recall, Precision and F-Factor have been used regu-
larly to evaluate the performance of Information Retrieval (IR)
algorithms, and they mainly focus on the number of correct
positive predictions (e.g., TP cases), i.e., they have less or even
no emphasis toward incorrect predictions (FN and FP cases)2.
FN and FP cases can be of great importance in safety-critical
systems. For example, a self-driving vehicle, that is supposed
to detect pedestrians, cyclists, etc. and prevent crashing into
them, failed to identify a pedestrian (FN), which results in
hitting the woman that later died at a hospital [6]. While
a FP (i.e., false alarm) in such ML-based detection system
may result in automatically applying the breaks of the vehicle
to prevent crashing into what the algorithm identifies as a








Fig. 1. The binary contingency table
pedestrian, a cyclist, etc. Although FP is not as critical as
hitting a pedestrian (FN), it is still a situation should be
avoided since it might lead to life-threatening accidents. To
this end, existing measures need to be tuned to fit the needs
for evaluating the safe performance of ML algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section II
presents some performance measures for ML algorithms, and
we discuss the problem statement and research challenges in
Section III. In Section IV, we present and discuss possible
solutions. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR ML ALGORITHMS
Several measures for evaluating the performance of ML
algorithms have been used in the literature. For instance, Preci-
sion, Recall and F-Factor have been used regularly to measure
the performance of Information Retrieval (IR) algorithms,
where Recall (True Positive Rate (TPR)) is the proportion of
True Positive (TP) cases that are correctly Predicted Positive
(equation 1). While Precision (also called Confidence in Data
Mining) denotes the proportion of Predicted Positive cases to
the Real Positives (equ.2). F1-score (also called F1-measure)
is intended to combine Precision and Recall measures into a
single measure of search “effectiveness” (equ.3). On the other
hand, Sensitivity (called Recall (equ.1) in IR) and Specificity
(equ.4) are commonly used in the Behavioral Sciences, and
they measure the proportion of real Positive/Negatives that are
correctly identified (TPR/ True Negative Rate (TNR)). Finally,
the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graph have been
first developed and used in signal detection theory and now
it is commonly used in Medical Sciences for evaluating the
tradeoff between hit rates (TPR) and false alarm rates (FPR)
rates of classifiers [7]. Taking a closer look at these measures,
we can conclude that most of them mainly focus on TP and
some on TN cases, i.e., they do not focus on FP nor FN cases.
Therefore, they need to be tuned to fit the needs for evaluating
the safe performance of ML algorithms.







































Fig. 2. A distribution of observations’ count against the predicted probability
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Consider for example an ML-based system for pedestrian
detection, the ML algorithm is said to safely perform when
its predictions are correct (TP and TN), i.e., the algorithm
correctly identifies a pedestrian as a pedestrian (TP), and
it correctly identifies a non-pedestrian as a non-pedestrian
(TN). While the ML algorithm may perform unsafely when
its predictions are wrong (FN and FP), i.e., the algorithm
incorrectly identifies a pedestrian as a non-pedestrian (FN) that
may result in catastrophic incident, and it incorrectly identifies
a non-pedestrian as a pedestrian (FP) that may result in non
significant, marginal, critical, or even catastrophic incident.
To this end, how can we evaluate the safe performance of
an ML algorithm taking into consideration the safety-critical
settings that such ML algorithm may perform in? In order to
answer this question, we need to tackle the following Research
Challenges (RCs):
RC1: How can we identify when the performance of an ML
algorithm is guaranteed to be correct? As previously
mentioned, algorithms make a classification decision
relying on the score of the observation with respect to
the classification threshold. Based on the distribution
of observation predictions that is shown in Figure 2,
the performance of an ML algorithm is guaranteed
to be correct when its predictions are correct (TP
and TN). It can be seen as the union of areas under
the green and red lines excluding the area resulting
from their intersection, where both FP and FN cases
co-locate. Although adjusting the decision threshold
to account for misclassification has been used in
several works (e.g., [5]), we cannot rely on such
solution since adjusting the threshold to decrease
FN cases, will increase the FP cases and vice versa.
Thus, we need new techniques to identify when the
performance of an ML algorithm is guaranteed to be
correct.
RC2: How the performance of an ML algorithm can be
safely interpreted in safety-critical settings, where
the algorithm may perform? After clearly identify-
ing when the performance of an ML algorithm is
guaranteed to be correct, we need to understand how
the results of the overall performance can be safely
interpreted by a safety-critical system that relies on
such results to make safety-critical decisions.
RC3: Which measures can be used to evaluate the safe
performance of ML algorithms? As previously dis-
cussed, existing measures need to be tuned to fit
the needs for evaluating the safe performance of
ML algorithms. Therefore, we need to develop new
measures specifically designed to be used for the
evaluation of the safe performance of ML algorithms.
IV. TOWARDS A METHOD FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE
SAFE PERFORMANCE OF ML ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present and discuss a set of measures
that can be used for the evaluation of the safe performance
of ML algorithms. In particular, we try to tackle each of the
research challenges raised in the previous section:
RC1: How can we identify when the performance of an
ML algorithm is guaranteed to be correct? As previ-
ously mentioned, this problem cannot be solved by
adjusting the threshold. However, it can be solved
following a commonly used safety principle, namely
safety reserves [8], which can be used to define safety
margins where the predictions of the algorithm are
guaranteed to be correct. In particular, instead of
adjusting the threshold, we define two thresholds
namely, Safe TP threshold and Safe TN threshold,
where the first specifies a threshold that any ob-
servation with scores higher than it, is sufficiently
guaranteed to be TP, and the last specifies a threshold
that any observation with scores lower than it, is
sufficiently guaranteed to be TN. In this context,
observations with scores higher than the Safe TP
threshold or lower than the Safe TN threshold are
sufficiently guaranteed to be correct. Accordingly,
observations with scores higher than Safe TN thresh-
old and lower than Safe TP threshold cannot be guar-
anteed to be correct. We refer to such observations
as No Prediction (NP). We differentiate between NP
Positive (NP-P) and NP Negative (NP-N) that refer
to positive and negative cases, which cannot be used
to make safety-critical decisions. Note that a signif-
icantly few numbers of wrong predictions (e.g., FP
and FN) might occur because the thresholds should
be defined with respect to the Tolerable Hazard Rate
(THR) concept [9]. THR is used to guarantee that
wrong predictions, which may result from relying
on the defined thresholds, will not exceed a pre-
defined level of risk. THR is commonly used in
safety standards (e.g., IEC 61508 [9], CENELEC
- EN 50129 [10]) as the probabilistic indicator for
identifying the related Safety Integrity Level (SIL)3
that is a measurement of performance required for
3Four SILs are defined (SIL1-4), where SIL 4 is the most dependable
Predicted probability 































Fig. 3. A distribution of observations’ count against the predicted probability
with safe TP and TN thresholds
safety-related functions. For example, the acceptable
range of THR for a safety-related function/system
classified as SIL4 should be within 10−9 < THR
< 10−8). The Safe TP and TN thresholds, a sample
distribution of TP, TN, NP-P, NP-N, FN, and FP are
shown in Figure 3.
RC2: How the performance of an ML algorithm can be
safely interpreted in safety-critical settings, where
the algorithm may perform? After providing criteria
for differentiating the guaranteed correct predictions
(TP and TN) and No Predictions (NP-P and NP-
N) cases of an ML algorithm4, we can discuss how
such predictions can be safely interpreted in safety-
critical settings. In particular, TP cases are mapped to
“Yes” decisions with respect to the phenomena under
observation. Considering the ML-based algorithm for
pedestrian detection, a TP case can be interpreted as
identifying a pedestrian as a pedestrian (Yes, it is a
pedestrian). TN cases are mapped to “No” decisions
with respect to the phenomena under observation.
Considering the same example, a TN case can be
interpreted as identifying a non-pedestrian as a non-
pedestrian (No, it is not a pedestrian). Finally, NP
(NP-P and NP-N) cases can be interpreted as “I
do not Know”, which prevents taking any deci-
sions since we cannot rely on such cases to make
a safety-critical decision. More specifically, a fail-
aware mechanism is adopted to deal with NP cases.
To this end, the system either make a safe decision
based on TP or TN, or it fail-aware and make no
decision when it is not guaranteed that such decision
will be safe. The mapping between TP, TN, and NP
on one hand and “Yes”, “No” and “I do not Know”
on the other hand is also shown in Figure 3.
RC3: Which measures can be used to evaluate the safe
performance of ML algorithms? At this point, the
4FP and FN are insignificant to be considered
predictions of an ML algorithm can be mainly clas-
sified into the following groups: TP, TN, NP-P, NP-
N, FP, and FN, which are organized into a new
contingency table (shown in Figure 4). In particular,
predictions that use to be classified as TP are now
classified either as TP or NP-P, and predictions that
use to be classified as TN are now classified either
as TN or NP-N. FP and FN predictions still exist
in the table but their numbers are insignificant to
be considered. Therefore, the four main groups of
predictions (e.g., TP, TN, NP-P and NP-N) can be
used to design the following measures for evaluating
the safe performance of ML algorithms:
1. TP rate (TPr) is the percentage of TP that are guaranteed





2. TN rate (TNr) is the percentage of TN that are guar-






3. Prediction rate (Pr) is the percentage of TP and TN that
are guaranteed to be correct to the total number of





4. TP Lost rate (TPLr) is the percentage of No Prediction








5. TN Lost rate (TNLr) is the percentage of No Prediction









6. No Prediction rate (NPr) is the percentage of No Predic-




= 1− Pr (10)
7. NP-P percentage (NP-Pp) is the percentage of NP-P to





8. NP-N percentage (NP-Np) is the percentage of NP-N to





Note that measures 11 and 12 can be very useful when the









Fig. 4. Contingency table for the safe performance of ML algorithms
V. CONCLUSION
We have argued that existing measures need to be tuned to
fit the needs for evaluating the safe performance of ML algo-
rithms. Our argument has been structured based on analyzing
existing measures and the special needs for evaluating the safe
performance of ML algorithms. We formulated this problem
as several research challenges. Then, we have discussed a
proposed solution for each of these challenges proposing a
new set of measures that can be used for the evaluation of
the safe performance of ML algorithms. We are planning to
demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the proposed
measures by applying them to several data sets concerning ML
algorithms that are incorporated in safety-critical systems.
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